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INTRODUCTION 
Political corruption is typically defined as “crimes by public officials for 
personal gain.”1 But there should be no doubt about the corrosive effects of 
malfeasance among public officials on the well-being of the polity in general. For 
example, several recent studies link unethical behavior in government to a wide 
variety of deleterious social outcomes, from economic growth to trust in 
government and participation in elections.2 The existence of such negative 
 
* Kayla Crider is a doctoral student in the department of political science at the University of 
Missouri; Jeffrey Milyo is the Middlebush Professor of Social Science in the department of economics 
at the University of Missouri. An earlier version of this study was presented September 14, 2012 at 
the symposium on “Foxes, Henhouses, and Commissions: Assessing the Nonpartisan Model in 
Election Administration, Redistricting, and Campaign Finance” held in the School of Law at the 
University of California, Irvine. Please direct comments and questions to: milyoj@missouri.edu. 
1. Edward L. Glaeser & Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1053, 1055 
(2006); Adriana S. Cordis, Corruption and the Composition of Public Spending in the United States 1 
(July 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of South Carolina Upstate). 
2. For a discussion of the relationship between political corruption and economic growth in 
the United States, see Noel D. Johnson et al., Corruption is Bad for Growth (Even in the United States), 147 
PUB. CHOICE 377 (2011). For a discussion of the association between political corruption and trust in 
718 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:717 
 
spillovers from political corruption underscores the need for public policies that 
limit the opportunities and rewards for such behavior, as well as increase the 
likelihood that corrupt activities are discovered and punished. 
State ethics commissions, along with so-called freedom of information acts3 
and campaign finance and lobbying regulations, are the quintessential institutional 
“fixes” for political corruption that have been adopted in the states over the last 
several decades. Yet there is surprisingly little evidence that institutions designed 
to enhance these goals actually work in practice. Instead, anticorruption policies 
tend to be based more on the intuition of public administrators or self-appointed 
watchdogs from the press than from any systematic evaluation. 
Perhaps the best example of this unfortunate tendency is found in the recent 
work of the State Integrity Investigation (SII), a consortium of nonprofit “good 
government” groups that rates states based on their risk of corruption.4 SII rated 
states based on fourteen different broad criteria based on data collected by 
reporters in each state; the ranking criteria include: public access to information, 
the presence of independent ethics commissions, methods of political financing, 
and methods of judicial selection.5 However, the methodology employed by SII is 
devoid of any analysis or reference to studies that would suggest the criteria used 
to rank states are effective in reducing political corruption. The result is thus a 
ranking of states’ risk of political corruption that strains credulity; for example, SII 
rates New Jersey as the least corrupt state despite its notoriously checkered 
experience with public corruption.6 
In fact, despite a robust scholarly literature on the determinants and 
consequences of political corruption, only recently have social scientists 
undertaken systematic evaluation studies of state political institutions in order to 
test the efficacy of common anticorruption policies. On a positive note (and in 
support of the intuition of many reform-minded observers), there is some 
evidence that methods of judicial selection and freedom of information acts really 
do have a significant impact corruption rates in the states.7 On the other hand, 
there is no support for the often strongly held belief that campaign finance 
 
government and voter turnout, see BETH A. ROSENSON, THE SHADOWLANDS OF CONDUCT 136–38 
(2005); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL 
CORRUPTION 141–43 (1995); Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. Tverdova, Corruption, Political 
Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 91 (2003). 
3. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–6276.48 (West 2008). 
4. ST. INTEGRITY INVESTIGATION, http://www.stateintegrity.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).  
5. Investigation Categories, ST. INTEGRITY INVESTIGATION, http://www.stateintegrity.org/ 
investigation_categories (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
6. Paul Sherman & David M. Primo, New Jersey Least Corrupt? Ha, Ha, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 
2012, at A13. 
7. See Adriana S. Cordis, Judicial Checks on Corruption in the United States, 10 ECON. 
GOVERNANCE 375, 378 (2009); Adriana S. Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine as Disinfectant: 
The Effect of State Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption 5 (Apr. 2, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922859. 
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reforms reduce political corruption.8 However, to date, there has been no 
systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of state ethics commissions in 
combatting public corruption. 
Nevertheless, the creation of state ethics commissions is generally 
understood by scholars to be a reaction to public concerns about corruption. 
Even so, there is a strong suspicion among these same scholars that such ethics 
commissions are inconsequential, or “toothless tiger[s].”9 But in the absence of 
any systematic attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of these commissions or 
their structures, the fundamental question as to whether state ethics commissions 
serve to reduce political corruption remains unanswered. 
Yet, despite the absence of supportive evidence, political actors frequently 
make strong claims about the importance of ethics reforms and the organizational 
structure of ethics commissions. For example, several states proclaim that their 
ethics commissions’ activities promote the integrity of democracy and public 
confidence in government by curbing political corruption: 
The Nevada Commission on Ethics . . . strives to enhance the public’s 
faith and confidence in government . . . .10 
The EEC [Executive Ethics Commission] promotes ethics in public 
service and ensures that the State’s business is conducted with efficiency, 
transparency, fairness, and integrity.11 
The Office of State Ethics promotes integrity in government by . . . .12 
The Ethics Commission . . . promotes Oklahoma citizens’ confidence in 
state government by . . . .13 
Of course, such self-serving arguments are to be expected from any political 
organization, but these claims stand in stark contrast to the comparative 
indifference given to ethics commissions in the social science literature. 
In this study, we conduct the first comprehensive statistical evaluation of the 
efficacy of state ethics commissions as anticorruption policy. As an initial and 
exploratory foray, we focus on two basic hypotheses: (1) Do state ethics 
commissions serve to reduce political corruption? and (2) Does it matter to this 
end whether state ethics commissions are structured as bipartisan or nonpartisan 
 
8. See Beth A. Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures on Perceptions of Corruption, 8 
ELECTION L.J. 31, 32 (2009); Adriana S. Cordis & Jeff Milyo, Do State Campaign Finance Reforms 
Reduce Political Corruption? 5 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
Missouri Political Economy Research Lab), available at http://web.missouri.edu/~milyoj/files/ 
Cordis_Milyo_CFR_and%20Corruption.pdf. 
9. See, e.g., ROSENSON, supra note 2, at 114. 
10. ST. OF NEV., COMM’N ON ETHICS, http://ethics.nv.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
11. ST. OF ILL., EXECUTIVE ETHICS COMM’N, http://www2.illinois.gov/eec/Pages/default 
.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
12. ST. OF CONN., OFF. OF ST. ETHICS, http://www.ct.gov/ethics/cwp/view.asp?a=3510&q 
=415018 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
13. OKLA. ETHICS COMM’N, http://www.ok.gov/oec (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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bodies? To be sure, state ethics commissions also differ in the details of 
appointment procedures, jurisdiction, investigative authority, manpower, and 
budgetary resources. However, consistent data across states and over time is 
sparse when it comes to these characteristics. Consequently, we start with the 
more fundamental and feasible investigation of whether state ethics commissions 
appear to be causally related to political corruption in the states. 
II. DATA AND METHODS 
We seek to understand the relationship between the presence and type of 
ethics commissions in the states and public corruption among state and local 
government officials via the standard statistical methods used in policy evaluation 
studies. This requires that we quantify the types of ethics commissions, as well as 
the amount of corruption across states and over time. In this section, we first 
describe our data sources and measurement strategies for these key variables; we 
then describe our analytical approach. 
A. State Ethics Commissions 
The key explanatory variables in our analysis are the presence and type of 
state ethics commissions. We obtained data on state ethics commissions from the 
Council of Government Ethics Laws (COGEL)14 and the National Council of 
State Legislatures (NCSL).15 Specifically, we coded the year each state commission 
was established, the manner in which commissioners are selected, and any 
restrictions on the partisan composition of these bodies (see Table A1).16 
Currently, forty-one states have ethics commissions; the states that do not 
are: Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Most state ethics commissions were established 
in the 1970s or earlier. The earliest adopting states were: Hawaii, Louisiana, and 
New Jersey. Between 1970 and 1980, another twenty-five states created ethics 
commissions, largely in reaction to the national Watergate scandal. A second wave 
of state ethics commissions were established between 1987 and 1994 in Arkansas, 
Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and 
West Virginia. Since that time, the creation of state ethics commissions has been 
sporadic; the most recent adopters include: Illinois in 2003; Colorado and 
Tennessee in 2006; and Utah in 2010. The staggered timing of the adoption of 
state ethics commissions, together with an absence of clear regional or partisan 
patterns, provides a natural experiment well suited for studying the effects of state 
commissions on political corruption in the states. 
 
14. THE COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS, http://www.cogel.org (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2013). 
15. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).  
16. In states with multiple ethics commissions, we focus on the regulatory body with the 
more expansive jurisdiction (i.e., not strictly legislative commissions). 
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Ethics commissions also exhibit diversity in their internal structure, which 
affords us another point of comparison. For the purpose of our analysis, we 
classified state ethics commissions into four broad types based upon restrictions 
on the party composition of commission: 1) bipartisan or nonpartisan; 2) no party 
majority; 3) not all one party; and 4) no restrictions. Bipartisan commissions are 
those that require an even number of commissioners evenly split between the two 
major parties; the states with this structure are: Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, and 
Tennessee. We also included Wisconsin, which prohibits commissioners from 
holding any partisan affiliation, in this category. While most states restrict 
appointments in order to prevent one party from holding all the seats on the 
commission, several also prohibit one party from holding a majority of the seats. 
States with the latter restriction are: Colorado, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Oregon, and Texas. In Table 1, we describe the number of states with 
each type of ethics commission and how the frequency of different types has 
changed by decade from 1980 to 2010. 
 
Table 1: Restrictions on Party Composition of State Ethics Commissions 
 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Number of States with Ethics Commissions: 28 32 37 41 
Bipartisan/nonpartisan 3 3 4 5 
No single party majority 4 4 5 7 
Not all members the same party 13 17 19 20 
No restrictions on party composition 8 8 9 9 
B. Public Corruption in the States 
The dependent variable throughout our analysis is political corruption in the 
states. Most empirical research on the causes and consequences of public 
corruption in the United States examine state-level data on convictions for 
“official corruption” as recorded by the Department of Justice. This is because the 
vast majority of all public corruption convictions in the United States are the 
result of federal prosecution.17 
We obtained administrative data on federal corruption convictions under 
license from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse 
University.18 TRAC employs the Freedom of Information Act to make large 
quantities of records from various federal agencies available to the public. 
Information on criminal cases from the Department of Justice is available 
beginning in 1986. Using the TRAC archive, we collected data on all convictions 
classified by prosecutors as official corruption among state and local government 
 
17. Cordis & Milyo, supra note 8, at 9. 
18. TRACFED, http://tracfed.syr.edu (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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officials from 1986–2010. Finally, in order to compare public corruption 
convictions across states, we normalized these by the pool of government officials 
in each state. For each year, we calculated the number of official corruption 
convictions per 10,000 state and local government full-time-equivalent civilian 
employees (FTEs). 
As shown in Table 2, there are few convictions among state and local public 
officials in the United States, at least relative to total state and local government 
employment. Over the twenty-five years we examined, the average annual 
conviction rate per 10,000 state and local government FTEs is just 0.13, with a 
standard deviation of 0.17. 
 




Dependent Variable:  
Official corruption convictions per 10,000 




Key Independent Variables:  
Ethics Commission (0,1): 0.67 
Bipartisan/nonpartisan (0,1) 0.07 
No party majority (0,1) 0.09 
Not all same party (0,1) 0.34 
 
Other State Institutional Controls:  
Index of campaign finance regulations (0 to 4) 1.74 
(1.12) 
Legislative term limits (0,1) 0.22 
Appointed judges (0,1) 0.54 
Partisan judicial elections (0,1) 0.16 
Republican control of state government (0,1) 0.19 
Democratic control of state government (0,1) 0.22 
 
State Demographic Controls:  
Age 65+ (%) 12.38 
(2.00) 
Black (%) 9.94 
(9.36) 
Other minority race (%) 5.60 
(9.47) 
Hispanic (%) 6.86 
(8.48) 
High school (%) 80.52 
(6.95) 
College (%) 22.58 
(5.06) 
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Poverty (%) 13.00 
(3.74) 
Union (%) 13.45 
(6.09) 
Log (state population) 15.01 
(1.01) 
Log (real per capita income) 10.41 
(0.18) 
 
C. Analytical Approach 
In order to estimate the effect of ethics commissions on the rate of public 
corruption in the states, it is necessary to account for the delay in observing 
corruption convictions. Apart from this, contemporaneous comparisons between 
the presence of ethics commissions and corruption may be confounded by the 
likelihood that ethics commissions are more likely to be adopted either in the 
wake of political scandal or in states that suffer from persistently high levels of 
public corruption. 
We addressed this challenge in three ways. First, we examined patterns in the 
raw data over the course of decades in order to observe any slow-moving trends. 
Second, we pooled our annual state-year observations into five nonoverlapping, 
five-year waves of state-level data; this permitted us to use multivariate regression 
analysis to examine the effects of state ethics commissions on average corruption 
convictions in years t+1 through t+5. We used this “waves analysis” to compare 
average measures of state institutions and demographics over the five years prior 
to average corruption convictions five years hence. Third, we utilized annual data 
and multivariate regression analysis to estimate eleven separate indicators for each 
year before and after the implementation of a particular reform from t5 to t+5. 
We then plotted the estimated coefficients and ninety-five percent confidence 
interval for these indicators. This allowed us to easily observe any delayed impacts 
of ethics commissions, as well as evidence of any “reverse causality” from 
episodes of corruption prior to reform. 
D. Control Variables Used in Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In all of our subsequent regression analyses, we controlled for an array of 
state political institutions and demographics, as well as year indicators.19 The 
 
19. The set of control variables is adopted from Cordis and Milyo, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
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particular institutions that we controlled for include an index of state campaign 
finance regulations, legislative term limits, judicial selection, and party control of 
state government. The list of state demographic controls include characteristics 
such as age, education, ethnicity, and race, as well as poverty, union membership, 
real per capita income, and state population. All control variables are listed in 
Table 2. 
All of the control variables that describe political institutions are simple 
binary indicators, except for the index of state campaign finance regulations. This 
index ranges from zero to four, based on whether states have no limits on 
contributions to candidates, limits on corporate contributions, limits on all 
contributions, public financing in gubernatorial elections, or public financing in 
both legislative and gubernatorial elections.20 
III. EVIDENCE FROM BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS 
Public corruption rates among state and local government officials are not 
highly correlated with either the presence of state ethics commission or 
restrictions on the party composition of these commissions. To illustrate this, we 
plotted average annual conviction rates for the period 2001–2010 for each state 
against the time period each state adopted an ethics commission in Figure 1A. 
Looking at the plot, there is no clear pattern to suggest that states with older 
ethics commissions experience less corruption than those with newer ethics 
commissions. Nor does it appear that states without ethics commissions 
experience systematically higher rates of corruption among state and local officials 
than states with ethics commissions of any vintage. 
  
 
20. The effects of state campaign finance laws on corruption are examined in Cordis and 
Milyo, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
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Figure 1A: Average Annual Conviction Rate in the 2000s 
Convictions per 10,000 State and Local Government FTEs 
 
 
Figure 1B: Average Annual Conviction Rate in the 2000s 
Convictions per 10,000 State and Local Government FTEs 
 
Notes: B=Bipartisan; NM=No Party Majority; and NP=Nonpartisan 
 
In fact, the Spearman rank correlation between average annual corruption 
convictions in the 2000s and a binary indicator for whether states have an ethics 
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with ethics commissions had a statistically significant higher corruption rate among 
state and local officials in the 2000s compared to states without any ethics 
commission. Of course, this perverse association may be the result of states with 
higher corruption rates choosing to adopt ethics commissions. On the other hand, 
recall that the raw data in Figure 1A does not suggest that the vintage of ethics 
commissions matters, either. Even so, we return to this concern momentarily. 
In order to check whether restrictions on party composition of commissions 
are correlated with conviction rates, we relabeled the scatter plot to show 
commissions that prohibit any party from controlling a majority of the 
commission seats (see Figure 1B). Once again, there is no obvious pattern 
indicating that either bipartisan/nonpartisan (B) or no party majority (NM) types 
of commissions experienced very different corruption rates in the 2000s 
compared to states with no restrictions on commission membership or even no 
ethics commission. Among states with ethics commissions, the Spearman rank 
correlation between the presence of restrictions on the commission composition 
and conviction rates is just 0.13 (p>0.10). This weak and statistically insignificant 
correlation suggests no association between corruption and the rules governing 
the composition of ethics commissions. 
We now reconsider the possibility that reverse causality confounds the 
foregoing analysis. In other words, states may establish ethics commissions in 
response to a history of particularly high corruption rates; and in that case, it may 
be possible that corruption in those states is on the decline, but still relatively 
higher than in other states. We addressed this concern by examining the changes in 
average annual conviction rates within each state from the 1990s to the 2000s. In 
Figure 2A, we plotted the change in these corruption rates among state and local 
officials against the vintage of each states ethics commission. Most observations 
lie above the zero-change line indicated in the diagram; this means that most 
states experienced an increase in corruption from the 1990s to the 2000s. This is 
especially true for North Dakota and Montana; the former has no ethics 
commission but the latter was an early adopter. In general, corruption rates appear 
to increase more slowly on average for states that are late adopters or have no 
ethics commission (other than North Dakota). However, the Spearman rank 
correlation between ethics commissions established prior to 2000 and changes in 
conviction rates is still positive (i.e., perverse), but small and not statistically 
significant (0.10; p>0.10). 
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Figure 2A: Change in Average Corruption Rates from 1990s to 2000s 
Convictions per 10,000 State and Local Government FTEs 
 
 
Figure 2B: Change in Average Corruption Rates from 1990s to 2000s 
Convictions per 10,000 State and Local Government FTEs 
 
 
Notes: B=Bipartisan; NM=No Party Majority; and NP=Nonpartisan 
 
Finally, we reexamined whether restrictions on party composition are related 
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Once again, there is no obvious directional relationship, although states with 
restrictions on the commission’s composition seem to experience less overall 
change in corruption rates over time. The absence of any significant relationship is 
confirmed by the Spearman rank correlation between restrictions on party 
majorities and changes in the conviction rate, which is just 0.05 (p>0.10). 
This first pass analysis reveals no strong bivariate relationship between the 
presence and type of state ethics commissions and public corruption. However, 
there may be important differences in other institutions or demographics across 
states that adopt ethics commissions and those differences serve to mask the true 
relationship in this simple analysis. For this reason, we turned to regression 
methods in order to control for other confounding factors that may affect political 
corruption rates in the states. 
IV. EVIDENCE FROM REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING FIVE-YEAR WAVES 
We regressed the average annual corruption rate for years t+1 to t+5 on the 
average annual values of independent variables from years t4 to t; this yields five 
nonoverlapping time periods (or five observations per state). That is, we matched 
state characteristics from 1981–1985 to corruption rates in 1986–1990; state 
characteristics in 1986–1990 to corruption rates in 1991–1995, etc. This approach 
mitigates concerns about both the time delay between corrupt acts and 
convictions, as well as any delay in the impact of ethics reforms on corruption 
rates. 
Regression estimates (and the absolute values of the t-statistics) for the 
waves analysis are shown in Table 3. In the first column, we report the estimated 
coefficients for a model that examines only whether any type of ethics 
commission was established in the prior five-year wave. The second column of 
Table 3 shows results for a model that examines commission types defined by 
restrictions on party affiliation. The two regression models are otherwise identical 
in the control variables that are included. For ease of exposition, we report the 
estimated coefficients for political institutions, but not for demographic or year 
variables (full results are available from the authors). All standard errors have been 
adjusted for clustering within state observations over time. 
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Table 3: Effects of Ethics Commissions on Corruption  
(Convictions per 10,000 State and Local Government FTEs) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Ethics commission 0.02 
(0.66) 
 
Bipartisan/nonpartisan  0.03 (0.83) 
No party majority  0.02 (0.30) 
Not all same party  0.02 (0.58) 
None  0.05 (0.61) 
























Controls for state demographics and year 
indicators Yes Yes 
R2 0.30 0.31 
Notes: **p<0.01 and *p<0.05. Coefficient estimates and absolute value of t-statistic from ordinary 
least squares estimation (standard errors clustered by state). 
 
In model (1), shown in the first column of Table 3, the estimated effect of 
establishing an ethics commission is to increase corruption rates by a statistically 
insignificant 0.02 convictions per 10,000 state and local government officials 
(p>0.10). In model (2), shown in the second column of Table 3, only 
bipartisan/nonpartisan commissions are estimated to reduce corruption rates 
slightly, albeit by an insignificant amount (0.03; p>0.10). Further, none of the 
commission composition variables are statistically significant, either individually or 
jointly. In both models, the estimated effects are not only statistically insignificant, 
but very small relative to the observed variation in the data. For comparison, the 
standard deviation in corruption rates is 0.17, or an order of magnitude larger than 
most of the estimated effects associated with ethics commissions. 
In fact, this regression analysis using five-year waves reveals no significant 
relationships between any state political institutions and political corruption. Of 
note, state campaign finance laws also have no significant effect on state 
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corruption rates; this is consistent with more detailed studies of the effects of state 
campaign finance reforms and corruption.21 Finally, the absence of systematic 
variation in corruption across states and over time is also attested to by the low 
values for R2 in these regression models. 
Statistical significance aside, the only type of commission that is associated 
with lower corruption convictions is the bipartisan/nonpartisan model. However, 
the magnitude of this effect is quite small compared to the observed variation in 
corruption convictions across states and over time. Because the standard deviation 
of the dependent variable is 0.17, the reduction in corruption rates from 
establishing a bipartisan/nonpartisan ethics commission is less than twenty 
percent of a standard deviation (and not statistically significant). 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the findings here may still be 
confounded by the presence of reverse causality. In order to formally address this 
concern, we examined the trends in annual corruption rates before and after 
episodes of reform that saw ethics commissions established in the states. 
V. EVIDENCE FROM REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING ANNUAL DATA 
In our final analysis, we regressed annual state conviction rates on 
contemporaneous annual values of the independent variables using the same 
control variables as above (i.e., model (1) in Table 3). However, instead of a 
simple indicator for the presence of an ethics commission, we now examine 
separate indicators for each of the five years leading up to and subsequent to the 
year in which a state ethics commission is established. We then plotted the 
estimated coefficients and ninety-five percent confidence interval for these eleven 
time dummy variables (from t5 to t+5) in Figure 3. The solid line in the figure 
represents the coefficient estimates for each time indicator and the dashed lines 
represent the ninety-five percent confidence intervals for these estimates. 
 
21. Cordis & Milyo, supra note 8, at 5. 
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Figure 3: Corruption Before and After Adoption of State Ethics Commissions 
















The purpose here is to check whether the failure to find significant effects of 
state ethics commissions on corruption is an accident of timing. Consider the 
scenario in which state ethics commissions are both the product of a rash of 
corruption and instrumental in mitigating such corruption, we might then observe 
a strong inverted V shape centered just to the right of t (given some delay in 
observing the effects of commissions on convictions). This would indicate a 
steady rise in corruption rates up to the creation of an ethics commission, then a 
decrease in corruption after its creation. In this scenario, it is possible for average 
corruption rates before and after the adoption of a state ethics commission to be 
identical (as indicated in Table 3). Consequently, the waves analysis above may fail 
to uncover time trends that would strongly indicate that state ethics commissions 
have a beneficial impact on corruption rates. 
We illustrate the estimated time trends in corruption before and after the 
adoption of ethics commissions in Figure 3. However, this analysis reveals very 
little in the way of significant movements in corruption convictions before or after 
episodes of reform. For most years, the ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
straddle the zero-change line, which indicates no statistically significant effect. 
There is a marginally significant increase in the conviction rates coincident 
with the establishment of state ethics commissions (i.e., t=0 in Figure 3). The 
magnitude of this peak is about 0.12 convictions per 10,000 state and local 
government FTEs (p<0.05), which would represent a 100% increase in the 
average conviction rate. Given some delay between the occurrence of political 
scandals and any subsequent corruption convictions, this indicates that state 
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scandal, albeit not in response to chronically high corruption rates. This last 
observation is supported by the absence of any significant corruption in the five 
years prior to the establishment of a state ethics commission. Finally, we observed 
no significant decrease in corruption rates in the five years after the creation of a 
state ethics commission. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
In this study, we conducted the first systematic statistical evaluation of the 
effects of state ethics commissions on public corruption among state and local 
officials. Overall, we found no strong or consistent support for the common 
claims made by political actors that state ethics commissions are important policy 
tools for reducing political corruption. Nor did we find any significant evidence 
that the partisan composition of these ethics watchdogs matter. Of course, it is 
not possible to “prove a negative”; the failure to reject the null hypothesis is not 
the same as proving no effect. 
Even so, the raw correlations and point estimates that we present indicate 
that state ethics commissions have only very weak, and possibly perverse, effects 
on public corruption. Consequently, while we cannot rule out some small 
beneficial impact of state ethics commissions, our results do imply that this 
outcome is no more likely than a harmful effect of similar or larger magnitude. As 
such, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no support for claims that state 
ethics commissions, including bipartisan and nonpartisan commissions, serve to 
reduce political corruption. 
Our analysis also sheds some light on the determinants of state adoption of 
ethics commissions. We did not observe that state ethics reforms are more likely 
to occur in states with a recent history of chronic political corruption, at least 
when looking at the adoption of state ethics commissions over the last twenty-five 
years. Rather, ethics commissions appear more likely to be adopted in the wake of 
a transitory political corruption scandal, but are otherwise unrelated to corruption 
rates in the preceding or subsequent five-year periods. 
The findings here should not be too surprising given the (thankfully) 
infrequent and sporadic nature of public corruption in the states; indeed, we find 
no significant association between political institutions (e.g., campaign finance 
regulations) and public corruption among state and local officials. This makes us 
less than sanguine that other features of state ethics commissions, such as 
jurisdiction, investigative authority, or resources will make an enormous difference 
in the efficacy of ethics commissions in addressing public corruption. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that state ethics commissions serve a more 
symbolic purpose or achieve some outcome that is difficult to directly measure. 
Future research should investigate whether these more nebulous effects are 
manifest in greater public trust and confidence in state government and the 
integrity of the democratic process.  




Table A1: State Adoption of Ethics Commissions 
 
State Year Restrictions on Party Membership 
Alabama 1974– None 
Alaska 1974– Not all one party 
Arizona   
Arkansas 1991– Not all one party 
California 1975– Not all one party 
Colorado 2006– No majority for any party 
Connecticut 1977– None 
Delaware 1994– Not all one party 
Florida 1974– Not all one party 
Georgia 1974– None 
Hawaii 1968– None 
Idaho   
Illinois 2003– (E) Not all one party 
Indiana 1974– Not all one party 
Iowa 1973– Bipartisan 
Kansas 1974– Not all one party 
Kentucky 1992– (E) None 
Louisiana 1964– Not all one party 
Maine 1976– No majority for any party 
Maryland 1979– Not all one party 
Massachusetts 1978– Not all one party 
Michigan 1973– Not all one party 
Minnesota 1974– Not all one party 
Mississippi 1979– None 
Missouri 1991– Bipartisan 
Montana 1975– None 
Nebraska 1976– Not all one party 
Nevada 1975– No majority for any party 
New Hampshire   
New Jersey 1968– No majority for any party 
New Mexico   
New York 1990– Not all one party 
North Carolina 1977–2006 
2007– 
None 
No majority for any party 
North Dakota   
Ohio 1974– Bipartisan 
Oklahoma 1990– Not all one party 
Oregon 1974– No majority for any party 
Pennsylvania 1979– Not all one party 
Rhode Island 1987– Not all one party 
South Carolina 1975– None 
South Dakota   
Tennessee 2006– Bipartisan 
Texas 1991– No majority for any party 
Utah 2010– None 
Vermont   
Virginia   
Washington 1973– Not all one party 
West Virginia 1989– Not all one party 
Wisconsin 1973– Nonpartisan 
Wyoming   
